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DEEPFAKES: A NEW CONTENT CATEGORY
FOR A DIGITAL AGE
Anna Pesetski*
INTRODUCTION
Technology has advanced rapidly in recent years, greatly benefitting society. One
such benefit is people’s ability to have quick and easy access to information through
news and social media.1 A recent concern, however, is that manipulated media, other-
wise known as “deepfakes,” are being released and passed off as truth.2 These videos
are crafted with technology that allows the creator to carefully change details of the
video’s subject to make him appear to do or say things that he never did.3 Deepfakes
are often depictions of political candidates or leaders and have the potential to influ-
ence voter choice, thereby altering the outcome of elections.4 Deepfakes have already
influenced the politics of other countries,5 and lawmakers expressed legitimate fears
about how deepfakes would affect the 2020 United States presidential election.6
The current unprotected categories of speech developed during a more primitive
technological age.7 Efforts have been made to combat deepfakes,8 but they have fallen
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School Class of 2021. Thank you to my parents,
Peter and Karen, for their endless support, and thank you to Paul Johnson for being my
biggest encourager. I also want to thank the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal editorial
board for all of their hard work.
1 See, e.g., Douglas Soule, US Lawmakers Weigh ‘Deepfake’ Concerns with First
Amendment Rights, GLOBEPOST (June 13, 2019), https://theglobepost.com/2019/06/13/deep
fakes-first-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/96YG-GL2R].
2 See Drew Harwell, Top AI Researchers Race to Detect ‘Deepfake’ Videos: ‘We are Out-
gunned,’ WASH. POST (June 12, 2019, 4:44 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/tech
nology/2019/06/12/top-ai-researchers-race-detect-deepfake-videos-we-are-outgunned/
[https://perma.cc/6CKV-XU2U]; see also Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes:
A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV.
1753, 1759 (2019) (discussing the emergence of new technologies that makes deepfakes
“more realistic and more difficult to debunk than they have been in the past”).
3 Carrie Mihalcik, California Laws Seek to Crack Down on Deepfakes in Politics and
Porn, CNET, https://www.cnet.com/news/california-laws-seek-to-crack-down-on-deepfakes
-in-politics-and-porn/ [https://perma.cc/78E5-QMRB] (Oct. 7, 2019, 8:32 AM).
4 See Harwell, supra note 2.
5 See id. (discussing political issues that deepfakes have caused in Gabon and Malaysia).
6 See Soule, supra note 1.
7 See generally, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); see also infra Section III.A.
8 See, e.g., Christopher Carbone, Google Releases 3,000 Deepfake Videos So Researchers
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short of effectively attacking the problem. It may be time for the Supreme Court to
reevaluate First Amendment protections in light of the current digital age and consider
the benefits of adding a new unprotected content category of speech for deepfakes.9 The
dangers deepfakes present far outweigh the concerns of the potential chilling effects
from restrictions on speech.10 Even though the Court has rejected arguments for new
categories of unprotected speech in recent years,11 deepfakes should ultimately consti-
tute a new content category because of the dangers they pose to the election process
and political systems; the “marketplace of ideas” fails to combat their falsity.12
This Note will argue that deepfakes can and should constitute a new content
category of unprotected speech without infringing on First Amendment protections of
speech.13 Deepfakes are created with a technological process that is accessible to the
average person and results in false depictions of people that even trained videograph-
ers have trouble spotting.14 These false depictions are often of political candidates or
officials, and they have the power to deceive voters and influence election outcomes.15
This Note will first examine the evolution of deepfakes and the dangers they present for
the nation’s political processes.16 Then it will analyze the justifications for First Amend-
ment protections and discuss why deepfakes do not fit within these justifications.17
It will next address the current categories of speech that the Supreme Court has deemed
to be unprotected and explain the process for how the Court declares speech to be un-
protected.18 This Note will then argue why the federal government should be able to
regulate deepfakes without offending the First Amendment through a narrowly tailored
law, address possible concerns with regulation, and discuss why current solutions fail
to adequately address the issue.19 Finally, it will conclude with a proposed regulation.20
Can Combat Them, FOX NEWS (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/tech/google-30
00-deepfake-videos-combat [https://perma.cc/3TTM-X7HK].
9 See Harwell, supra note 2.
10 See Ben Christopher, Can California Crack Down on Deepfakes Without Violating the
First Amendment?, CAL MATTERS, https://calmatters.org/politics/2019/07/deepfake-berman
-california-politics-ab730-fake-news-first-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/8NWE-KL7B] (July 8,
2019).
11 See generally, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (plurality opinion);
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
12 This Note will touch on the fact that deepfakes have been used for fake pornography,
but the primary focus will be their use in elections and political processes and what law-
makers can do to combat those deepfakes.
13 See infra Part I.
14 Herbert B. Dixon, Jr., Deepfakes: More Frightening Than Photoshop on Steroids, 58
JUDGES’ J., Summer 2019, at 35, 35.
15 See Harwell, supra note 2.
16 See infra Part I.
17 See infra Part II.
18 See infra Part III.
19 See infra Parts IV–V.
20 See infra Part VI.
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I. THE RISE OF DEEPFAKES AND THEIR IMPACT
Even though deepfakes are a relatively new phenomenon, their notoriety has
quickly spread.21 This Part will explore deepfakes generally and expound on both
their current and potential dangers to society.
A. Definition of Deepfake
The term “deepfake” is relatively new to the vocabulary of American society and
has been used to describe the convincingly realistic false videos that have been dis-
seminated via social and news media.22 Deepfakes are “video forgeries that make
people appear to do or say things they didn’t. They use a type of facial recognition
technology to mash up identity so well you don’t even question its truth.”23 Software
that creates deepfakes “studies the statistical patterns in a data set, such as a set of
images or videos, and then generates convincing fake videos.”24 The technology be-
hind the creation of deepfakes is advanced, but a person with more general knowledge
of videography can easily find an instructional video on YouTube explaining how
to manipulate a video to create his own deepfake.25 A recent example of manipulated
media was a doctored video of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, which depicted the po-
litical official slurring her words as if she were drunk during a speech.26 This video
could be referred to as a “shallowfake” because the type of manipulation used to
alter the video, where context was removed and Pelosi’s voice was simply slowed
down, does not quite rise to the level of the facial recognition and mashup technology
used to create deepfakes.27 The video was discovered to be altered, but it still received
more than 2.5 million views on social media.28 Videos of this nature have the power to
influence voter choice and the opinions of political officials.29 Other recent examples
of deepfakes include one of Mark Zuckerberg talking about stealing the data of
Facebook users30 and one by Jordan Peele depicting former President Barack Obama
calling President Trump “a total and complete dipshit.”31 Peele’s video was “[s]et in
what appears to be the Oval Office” and “depicts the former president speaking fondly
21 See Mihalcik, supra note 3 (noting the attention deepfakes gained after an altered video
of Nancy Pelosi was disseminated on social media); see also Soule, supra note 1.
22 See Dixon, supra note 14, at 35; Mihalcik, supra note 3.
23 Mihalcik, supra note 3.
24 Dixon, supra note 14, at 36.
25 Christopher, supra note 10.
26 Mihalcik, supra note 3.
27 Id.; see Dixon, supra note 14, at 35.
28 Doctored Nancy Pelosi Video Highlights Threat of “Deepfake” Tech, CBS NEWS,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/doctored-nancy-pelosi-video-highlights-threat-of-deepfake
-tech-2019-05-25/ [https://perma.cc/RW2D-6ZV2] (May 26, 2019, 9:26 AM).
29 See Mihalcik, supra note 3.
30 Soule, supra note 1.
31 Christopher, supra note 10.
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of the militant anti-colonial villain of the ‘Black Panther’ comic franchise and claim-
ing that Housing Secretary Ben Carson is brainwashed.”32 The video was created to
make the public aware of deepfake technology and as a warning about its “potential
misuses.”33 Former President Obama publicly commented on deepfakes and the danger
of their deception.34 The false information in these videos has the ability to influence
opinions and can clearly be harmful to a video subject’s reputation.
B. Deepfake Usage
Deepfakes have been used to serve various purposes by their creators.35 One of
the dominating uses is fake pornography.36 A recent study found that 96% of over
14,000 identified deepfake videos online were pornographic, all of which depicted
women, often popular celebrities.37 Pornographic deepfakes can cause serious emo-
tional and psychological issues and even lead to the harassment of the subject of the
video.38 Such was the case for Rana Ayyub, an Indian investigative journalist who
was targeted with a fake pornographic video in retaliation for her critique of the
Indian prime minister and his political party.39 The harassment and emotional
turmoil resulting from the deepfake sent her to the hospital with heart palpitations.40
Deepfakes have also been used to smear political candidates and officials, even
to the point of interfering with elections41 and governments at the international level.42
Outside of the United States, an unsuccessful coup by the Gabonese military was
sparked when the president’s opponents claimed a video of the president, whom many
in the country previously believed to be in declining health or dead, was a deepfake.43
In Malaysia, a video of “a man’s seeming confession to having sex with a local cabinet
minister” has come to light as a possible deepfake.44 Moldova recently experienced
interference in its elections when a deepfake was posted on Al Jazeera’s Facebook
page showing, “a mayoral candidate’s proposal to lease an island to the United Arab
Emirates,” which went viral.45 United States lawmakers are concerned about the
32 Id.
33 Holly Kathleen Hall, Deepfake Videos: When Seeing Isn’t Believing, 27 CATH. U. J.
L. & TECH., Fall 2018, at 51, 60.
34 See Harwell, supra note 2.
35 See Mihalcik, supra note 3 (“While some deepfakes are silly and fun, others are
misleading and even abusive.”).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Christopher, supra note 10.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See Hall, supra note 33, at 55.
42 See Harwell, supra note 2.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Sonya Swink & Kyle Qualls, ‘Deep Fake’ Videos Could Change Outcome of Electoral
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possibility of deepfakes exerting a similar influence on United States voters, particu-
larly in the 2020 presidential election.46
A third usage of deepfakes is humor.47 Parody and satire of public figures are
protected uses of speech under the First Amendment,48 and deepfakes have been cre-
ated for these less sinister purposes. Jimmy Kimmel, for example, played a video of
President Donald Trump on his show where the president’s voice was slowed down
so that he sounded drunk while giving a speech on a segment called “Drunk Donald
Trump.”49 The video has a disclaimer stating that it was slowed down by the creators
of the show, which allowed audiences to understand that the video was fake.50 The use
of deepfakes for humor poses little to no threat, because audiences viewing the video
understand that it is not real and was only intended to be funny.51
C. Dangers of Deepfakes
Deepfakes present many dangers. Lawmakers are concerned that these videos
“could threaten national security, the voting process—and, potentially, their reputa-
tions.”52 The most crucial and timely of these dangers is the potential influence on
election outcomes.53 A deepfake of a political candidate supporting a policy contrary
to his platform, or one that he simply does not endorse, could harm the candidate’s
chances of winning the election.54 House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam
Schiff has voiced his fears about deepfakes influencing the presidential election in 2020
“with the government, media, and public struggling to discern what is real and fake.”55
Schiff went on to say that part of the danger of deepfakes lies in “the ubiquity of
social media and the velocity at which false information can spread.”56
To better understand the danger of deepfakes, it is helpful to look at how false
news spreads generally.57 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) performed
an in-depth Twitter study that “analyzed around 126,000 cascading news stories
tweeted by 3 million users over more than 10 years.”58 The study discovered that “a
Races, GLOBEPOST (Aug. 1, 2018), https://theglobepost.com/2018/08/01/deep-fake-videos/
[https://perma.cc/G5VW-2KVY].
46 See Harwell, supra note 2.
47 See Mihalcik, supra note 3.
48 See Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55–57 (1988).
49 Jimmy Kimmel Live, Drunk Donald Trump—Why He Got Elected, YOUTUBE (Feb. 9,
2017), https://youtu.be/dK3LbVFgyqQ [https://perma.cc/9MXZ-LZTK].
50 Id.
51 See, e.g., Christopher, supra note 10.
52 Harwell, supra note 2.
53 See id.
54 See Dixon, supra note 14, at 37.
55 Soule, supra note 1.
56 Id.
57 See Hall, supra note 33, at 55.
58 Id.
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fabricated story reaches 1,500 people six times more rapidly than a true story. False
political stories were particularly effective in being spread, more than false stories
about business, terrorism or science.”59 Given how rapidly false political stories can
spread and the vast number of people they reach, it is easy to see why deepfakes are
particularly dangerous. Detecting fake text-based stories is already challenging enough,
and deepfakes present an even greater obstacle because viewers must question the
validity of what they see instead of just what they read.60
Deception is a strong force that can have lasting effects on the public’s opinions
of political candidates or government officials.61 Studies involving subjects that were
purposely given false information about the views of a candidate and then later told
that the information was false have shown that people continued to think poorly of
those candidates, even with the knowledge that those views were misrepresented.62
Voters may change their minds about which candidate they choose, or they might
experience a phenomenon called “reality apathy,” where they find it too difficult to
discern what is true and decide to just vote along the lines of their political affiliations.63
In essence, the right to vote becomes “nullified” because voters receive false informa-
tion, which influences their voting choices.64 Americans have stated that doctored
videos and images have impeded their understanding of the facts of current events,65
making it more difficult to form educated opinions.66 Siwei Lyu, the director of a
computer-vision lab at the State University of New York at Albany, posited that “media
manipulation can have a broader psychological effect, by subtly shifting people’s
understandings of politicians, events and ideas.”67 People will likely question the
validity of more videos they see online or in the media, even when the videos are
completely true, leading to more confusion.68
National security is another major concern surrounding deepfakes.69 For exam-
ple, if a deepfake was made of President Trump declaring war on another country,
there could be a very real national security issue if the other country perceived the
threat to be legitimate.70 Even if the video was discovered to be fake, it may be too
late to avoid serious problems resulting from it.71 Senator Marco Rubio, a member
59 Id.
60 See id. at 55–56 (noting society’s vulnerability to misinformation).
61 Rebecca Green, Counterfeit Campaign Speech, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1445, 1463 (2019).
62 Id. at 1463–64.
63 Harwell, supra note 2.
64 Green, supra note 61, at 1457–58 (discussing the potential harm to voters who base
their votes on falsified positions).
65 See Harwell, supra note 2 (discussing a Pew Research study).
66 See Green, supra note 61, at 1458.
67 Harwell, supra note 2.
68 See Dixon, supra note 14, at 37; Harwell, supra note 2.
69 Harwell, supra note 2; see CBS NEWS, supra note 28.
70 See CBS NEWS, supra note 28.
71 See, e.g., id.; Green, supra note 61, at 1463.
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of the Senate Intelligence Committee, expressed his concerns surrounding deepfakes
and provided the example of a foreign intelligence agency producing “a deepfake
of a United States soldier massacring civilians overseas.”72 A video of that nature could
create fear among the American people and possibly disrupt relationships between
the United States and foreign powers.73
A third major concern resulting from deepfakes is the possible damage to the repu-
tation of government officials.74 A Belgian political party recently crafted and dissemi-
nated a deepfake advertisement “featuring what appeared to be President Trump
criticizing the Paris Climate Accord” in an attempt to get signatures for a climate-
change petition.75 Even though the video was “intentionally messy” to signal its inau-
thenticity, many people who viewed the video believed it to be real.76 This video could
have damaged the reputation of President Trump with some citizens and may have
influenced voters’ choices in the 2020 election. Deepfakes of this nature, especially if
their falsity remains undiscovered, could lead citizens to distrust their government.77
II. FIRST AMENDMENT THEORIES AND DEEPFAKES
The First Amendment’s protection of free speech is vital to the exchange of ideas
in American society.78 This Part will review the justifications and theories behind the
First Amendment and analyze where the rationale for allowing deepfakes may fall
among the different justifications.
A. Justifications for First Amendment Protections
Free speech protections under the First Amendment are at the core of our democ-
racy.79 “Free speech has been thought to serve three principal values: advancing
knowledge and ‘truth’ in the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ facilitating representative democ-
racy and self-government, and promoting individual autonomy, self-expression and
self-fulfillment.”80 One dominant theory behind permitting deepfakes under the First
Amendment is the marketplace of ideas.81 The theory posits that false ideas should
be allowed because they are needed for true ideas to emerge and that false ideas will
72 Hall, supra note 33, at 59.
73 See id. at 59–60.
74 See id. at 60.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See id. at 59–60.
78 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), over-
ruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (discussing the Founding Fathers’
belief that free speech was necessary for discussion and protection against false speech).
79 See id.
80 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 5 (6th ed. 2016).
81 See Hall, supra note 33, at 63–64.
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be driven out by true ideas in the long run.82 However, it can take time for true ideas
to expose false ones because “[t]he problem is that the short run may be very long,
that one short run follows hard upon another, and that we may become overwhelmed
by the inexhaustible supply of freshly minted, often very seductive, false ideas.”83
Given the rate deepfakes can be created and distributed, they certainly have the ability
to become an inexhaustible supply.84
B. First Amendment Theories—Why Deepfakes Cannot Coexist
The marketplace of ideas argument for free speech protections is ingrained in
First Amendment jurisprudence, for “freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.”85 The
Founding Fathers urged that conversation and counterspeech are the proper responses
to false or harmful speech and that government suppression of ideas is a dangerous
step toward tyranny.86 However, the discovery of truth can become difficult when
people may not be able to believe what they see: a phenomenon the Founders could not
have anticipated.87 Following the deepfake made about him by Jordan Peele, former
President Barack Obama commented on the nature of deepfakes stating, “[t]he market-
place of ideas that is the basis of our democratic practice has difficulty working if
we don’t have some common baseline of what’s true and what’s not.”88
Given the convincing nature of deepfakes, it will likely take a long time for true
ideas to stamp out the false videos.89 By that time, the damage will probably already be
done and there may even be another deepfake to combat.90 The “reliance on counter-
speech is increasingly ineffectual and potentially damaging to democracy.”91 Hany
82 See Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1130 (1979).
83 Id.
84 See Hall, supra note 33, at 51–52 (discussing the advancement of deepfake technology
and the increasing ability of the general public to create and disseminate fake videos).
85 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled
in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (explaining the First Amendment
beliefs of the Founding Fathers).
86 See id.
87 See Hall, supra note 33, at 59 (noting that the United States Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency is aware of this problem and has funded a media forensics project to aid the
public in making the correct determinations about fake videos).
88 Harwell, supra note 2.
89 See id. (noting the difficulties of evaluating which videos are fake); Chesney & Citron,
supra note 2, at 1777–78 (discussing how the “large-scale erosion of public faith” in empirical
evidence has made it difficult for truthful information to surface in the democratic discourse).
90 See Hall, supra note 33, at 59 (“The pervasiveness and ease of the technology could
mean substantial numbers of deceptive videos in the marketplace that the government is ill-
prepared to deal with.”).
91 Id. at 69 (quoting Philip M. Napoli, What If More Speech Is No Longer the Solution?
First Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMMC’NS L.J.
55, 97 (2018)).
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Farid, a professor of computer science at the University of California at Berkeley, stated
that “[t]he number of people working on the video-synthesis side, as opposed to the de-
tector side, is 100 to 1.”92 In fact, “a disinformation campaign using deepfake videos
probably would catch fire because of the reward structure of the modern Web, in which
shocking material drives bigger audiences—and can spread further and faster than
the truth.”93
The marketplace of ideas theory may not be an adequate justification for deep-
fakes because true counterspeech is not enough to reveal their falsity, given their
realistic appearance.94 The theory fails because the ability to fact-check the validity of
the content of a deepfake is incredibly difficult, even near impossible.95 For example,
in United States v. Alvarez, the lie that Alvarez told—claiming that he won the Con-
gressional Medal of Honor—could easily be verified.96 The list of award winners
could be checked, and people could easily call Alvarez out for his false statement.97
Deepfakes, on the other hand, are hard to prove false because of the technology and
expertise needed to detect them.98 It is much easier to prove that someone said some-
thing false, rather than prove that a convincingly realistic video is fake.
Deepfakes also fail under the First Amendment justifications of personal autonomy
and self-government. Voters generally have the responsibility to thoroughly research
political candidates to make an informed voting choice, which includes choosing the
sources from which they glean information.99 If a voter reads conflicting information
about a candidate, it is his duty to further research the candidate’s platform to discern
what is true.100 Deepfakes, however, make this task nearly impossible because there
is virtually no way for a voter to confirm whether the deepfake has portrayed accurate
information.101 Deepfakes, in essence, rob voters of their personal autonomy to make
educated, informed decisions concerning candidates because voters are unable to
determine if the speech that they watched and heard a candidate deliver was real.102
The First Amendment cannot serve the democratic process well if voters must make
92 Harwell, supra note 2.
93 Id. (discussing a worry of Rachel Thomas, a co-founder of the machine-learning lab
Fast.ai).
94 See Hall, supra note 33, at 52.
95 See Harwell, supra note 2 (discussing the problems with identifying deepfake videos
and how the seemingly “insurmountable” challenge “has led some researchers to instead
pursue an authentication system that would fingerprint footage right as it’s captured”).
96 567 U.S. 709, 726–27, 729 (2012).
97 Id. at 727, 729.
98 See Harwell, supra note 2; Green, supra note 61, at 1458.
99 See Green, supra note 61, at 1458.
100 See id.
101 See id. (“The voter is not only tasked with determining the authenticity of the coun-
terfeited candidate speech (difficult even for forensic computer scientists); the voter must put
all speech from all candidates to an authenticity test if counterfeit campaign speech is
allowed to run rampant.”).
102 See id. at 1457–58.
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decisions based on false information. Thus, deepfakes run afoul of the justifications
for freedom of speech.
III. CURRENT UNPROTECTED CONTENT CATEGORIES
This Part will outline the current unprotected content categories of speech and
analyze how deepfakes compare with those categories. Ultimately, this Note will
argue that deepfakes, while bearing some similarities to defamation and fraud, are
still categorically different from any of the current unprotected areas of speech.
A. Overview of Categories
The current categories of unprotected speech that have been established by the
Supreme Court are obscenity,103 defamation,104 fraud,105 incitement,106 fighting words,107
true threats,108 speech integral to criminal conduct,109 and child pornography.110 These
limited categories, developed through various instances of harmful speech in society,
show that the Court is reluctant to restrict freedom of speech.111 The exclusion of
incitement from protected speech, for example, arose in response to a KKK rally that
resulted in a violation of Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism Act, which was enacted during
the First Red Scare.112 The participants in the rally publicly advocated for violence
coupled with derogatory references to minority groups.113 Ohio’s Criminal Syndical-
ism Act prohibited advocacy of violence for the purpose of political or industrial
reform.114 The Court determined that the statute was unconstitutional and expressed
that “free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to in-
citing or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.”115 Advocating for violence against minorities is clearly harmful speech, but the
103 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
104 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
105 See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003).
106 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (per curiam).
107 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1942).
108 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003).
109 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297–98 (2008).
110 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
111 See Black, 538 U.S. at 358–59 (discussing the Court’s hesitance to restrict freedom of
speech, allowing protection of “even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might
find distasteful or discomforting” and instead only restricting speech in cases where there
were potential societal harms in allowing the speech).
112 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444–45, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
113 See id. at 446.
114 Id. at 448.
115 Id. at 447.
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Court still stated that such speech was protected unless it rose to the level of incite-
ment.116 The incitement test illustrates the stringent scrutiny that speech restrictions are
subject to and the heightened importance the Court places on freedom of speech.117
B. Process for Determining Unprotected Content Categories
The Supreme Court has rejected the notion of using an ad hoc balancing standard
alone to declare a category of speech to be unprotected.118 The government cannot
prohibit a type of speech simply because it determines that the speech is valueless
or that the damage of the speech outweighs its societal benefits.119 The Court seems
to take a number of factors into consideration when prohibiting speech, one such
factor being a reasonable person standard.120 When obscenity was determined to be
unprotected in Miller v. California, the Court stated that part of the test was “whether
‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.”121 In other words, a reasonable
person must find the speech in question to be offensive and not in line with the sexual
interest of the community in order for it to be obscene.122 This standard represents
the fact that the government cannot be the only party to find the speech valueless.123
Another factor is the harm that the speech creates.124 In all of the unprotected
categories, the subject of the speech or society generally is likely to be harmed by
the speech.125 A state’s prohibition of child pornography in New York v. Ferber, for
example, was not based on categorical balancing alone; there was also the compel-
ling interest of protecting children.126 The arguments for any potential value of the
speech were moot because the harm to children resulting from child pornography
was far greater.127 This point is also easily illustrated by the restriction of speech that
116 See id. at 447–48.
117 See id.
118 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First Amendment’s guarantee
of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing
of relative social costs and benefits.”).
119 See id. at 471.
120 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
121 Id. (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)).
122 See id.
123 See id. (stating that the standard looks to “the average person” rather than another
entity such as the government).
124 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982) (holding that child pornography
was not protected under the First Amendment as there was a compelling interest of protecting
children from harm).
125 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–59 (2003) (noting that speech restrictions
under the First Amendment weigh the social value of truth against the societal interests of
order and morality (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992))).
126 See 458 U.S. at 763–64.
127 See id. (“[I]t is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has been accepted
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constitutes a true threat.128 This type of speech “encompass[es] those statements
where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”129
Clearly there is a strong interest in protecting people from violence or the fear of
violence, and harm is a consideration in banning true threats.130
A third consideration is the narrow tailoring of a speech regulation.131 In order
for a speech regulation to be valid, it must not be overbroad or vague.132 The phrase
“sexual conduct,” for example, is too broad and vague for a statute attempting to
prohibit obscenity.133 The state law would need to narrowly define what the phrase
means and what specific behavior falls under it.134 Otherwise, protected speech
would be swept in under the statute.135
There may be other categories of unprotected speech, but the Court has not
recognized a new category since child pornography in Ferber in 1982.136 The Court
will likely require “persuasive” evidence to consider a new category137 in addition
to the restrictions being part of a long tradition, even if thus far unrecognized.138
C. Evaluating Deepfakes Against Unprotected Content
Justifications for prohibiting deepfakes are similar to those for prohibiting defa-
mation.139 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the New York Times published an
advertisement about the civil rights student movement.140 An elected commissioner
because it may be appropriately generalized that within the confines of the given classifi-
cation, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any,
at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required.”).
128 See Black, 538 U.S. at 363 (allowing states to ban “those forms of intimidation that are
most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm”).
129 Id. at 359.
130 See id. (discussing true threats and other categories of free speech that are limited due
to the potential violence they could cause).
131 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (noting that the
classes of unprotected speech are “well-defined and narrowly limited”).
132 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (noting that a law regulating
speech may be invalidated if it is overbroad).
133 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973).
134 See id. at 23–26.
135 See id. at 26–27.
136 See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
137 See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471 (quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990))
(noting that the Court found the argument in Ferber that child pornography was “intrinsically
related” to child abuse “persuasive” (first quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759, 761; and then
quoting Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110)).
138 See id. at 471–72.
139 Compare N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964), with Erik Gerstner,
Face/Off: “DeepFake” Face Swaps and Privacy Laws, 87 DEF. COUNS. J., Jan. 2020, at 1, 6.
140 376 U.S. at 256–57.
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of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a civil libel action against the newspaper because
he claimed that it had printed libelous statements, such as the incorrect number of
times that Martin Luther King, Jr. was arrested.141 It is true that some of the state-
ments were inaccurate, but it did not amount to defamation because the statements
were about a public official and not made with actual malice.142 The Court stated
that the protection of the First Amendment requires “a federal rule that prohibits a
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood . . . unless he
proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”143 Similar
to defamation, many deepfakes are created with actual malice and intent to cause
harm to the subject of the video’s reputation or character.144 Given the sinister nature
of many deepfakes, particularly those that are created with the intent to influence
election outcomes, the actual malice standard seems to have been met.145
Deepfakes should be their own category of unprotected speech separate from
defamation, however, for justifications similar to those separating the category of
child pornography from obscenity.146 Just as child pornography was designated as
a separate content category from obscenity because of its unique harm to children,147
deepfakes should be in a category separate from defamation because of their unique
harm to the political and democratic processes.148 Revisiting Sullivan, the fact that the
New York Times misstated some facts created little harm and the facts were easily
verified.149 The reputation of Sullivan likely did not suffer at length.150 Deepfakes,
on the other hand, are difficult to detect without advanced technology and can easily
reach millions of viewers,151 necessitating a protection greater than the actual malice
standard for defamation claims concerning public officials.152
Justifications for prohibiting deepfakes are also similar to those for prohibiting
fraud.153 In Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, telemarketers had a
141 See id. at 256, 258.
142 See id. at 286.
143 Id. at 279–80.
144 See Gerstner, supra note 139, at 6.
145 See id.; see also Grace Shao, Fake Videos Could be the Next Big Problem in the 2020
Elections, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/15/deepfakes-could-be-problem-for-the
-2020-election.html [https://perma.cc/KCM2-UP7C] (Jan. 17, 2020, 2:49 AM).
146 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
147 See id.
148 See Shao, supra note 145.
149 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 260 (1964).
150 See id. at 260.
151 See Harwell, supra note 2.
152 See id.
153 Compare Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 623–24 (2003),
with Soule, supra note 1 (The Court’s determination that fraud was unprotected because of the
intent to deceive is similar to the reasoning lawmakers have posited for prohibiting deep-
fakes; their intent is to deceive voters.).
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fundraising contract with a “charitable nonprofit corporation organized to advance the
welfare of Vietnam veterans; under the contracts, the fundraisers were to retain 85 per-
cent of the proceeds of their fundraising endeavors.”154 In reality, less than fifteen cents
per dollar was donated to the charity and the rest went primarily to the personal benefit
of the fundraisers.155 Although the Supreme Court had previously rejected state statutes
enacted in an effort to prevent fraud that banned solicitations when fundraising costs
were high,156 it determined that fraud itself was not protected speech under the First
Amendment.157 The Court reasoned that “[f]raud actions so tailored, targeting
misleading affirmative representations about how donations will be used, are plainly
distinguishable” from blanket bans on soliciting funds.158 The Court determined that
“[s]tates may maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false or misleading repre-
sentations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used.”159
Deepfakes of political candidates and officials most certainly contain false or
misleading representations, making them similar to fraud.160 However, deepfakes
pose an even greater threat to society than misrepresentations about how charitable
donations will be used because of their ability to influence voter choice and citizens’
views of political officials.161 Additionally, deepfakes are more difficult to track and
can reach a larger sphere of people through social media.162 Therefore, deepfakes
should constitute their own content category separate from the category of fraud
because of their unique danger.163
IV. DEEPFAKES: A NEW CONTENT CATEGORY
Given the dangers that deepfakes present, it may be time for the Supreme Court
to prohibit them as a new content category of unprotected speech under the First
Amendment.164 Some regulations and solutions have been implemented or suggested
to combat deepfakes, but these solutions are not enough to truly counteract their
dangerous effects.165
154 538 U.S. at 605.
155 Id. at 605–06.
156 Id. at 617.
157 Id. at 612.
158 Id. at 619.
159 Id. at 624.
160 See id.; Harwell, supra note 2.
161 Compare Illinois ex rel. Madigan, 538 U.S. at 624, with Mihalcik, supra note 3 (ex-
plaining how deepfakes may influence voters’ political choices, which are fundamental to
our democracy, giving them a larger reach than fraud).
162 See Harwell, supra note 2.
163 See Mihalcik, supra note 3; Harwell, supra note 2.
164 See Christopher, supra note 10.
165 See Rich Haridy, California Bans Political Deepfake Videos Ahead of 2020 Elections,
NEW ATLAS (Oct. 7, 2019), https://newatlas.com/computers/california-bans-political-deep
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A. California Statute
Responding to concerns about the effects of deepfakes on elections, California
Assemblyman Marc Berman, chair of the Assembly’s election committee, proposed
a bill that would prohibit the dissemination of deepfakes concerning a candidate
within sixty days of an election.166 The bill goes on to explain that a candidate may
seek injunctive relief if such manipulated media is released.167 After viewing the
deepfake of former President Barack Obama created by Jordan Peele, Berman stated,
“I immediately realized, ‘Wow, this is a technology that plays right into the hands
of people who are trying to influence our elections like we saw in 2016.’”168 The
governor signed the bill on October 3, 2019, and it went into effect in 2020 with
exemptions for broadcasting outlets and satire or parody.169 Berman recognized that
“technological developments make it increasingly difficult to sort fake from real
news,” which prompted him to find a way to neutralize manipulated media.170
The law seems to pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny, the standard
for content-based regulations, which requires a compelling government interest and
a narrowly tailored statute.171 California certainly has a compelling interest in
protecting the integrity of its elections.172 This statute is also narrowly tailored to fit
deepfakes targeting political candidates around elections, which have the potential
to influence voters, and provides limited exceptions to the prohibition.173 The statute
is a step in the right direction but only applies to California residents.174 It is also
unclear as to whether a person would violate the statute simply by sharing the video
on social media, even if he did not create the deepfake.175
The California statute bears some similarity to the issue in Citizens United v.
FEC.176 In that case, Citizens United, a nonprofit group, produced a documentary
fake-videos-2020-elections/ [https://perma.cc/8S5Z-F46G] (discussing the apprehension sur-
rounding the enactment of new deepfake laws).
166 A.B. 730, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess., ch. 493 (Cal. 2019); see also id., legislative counsel’s
digest (“This bill would, until January 1, 2023, instead prohibit a person, committee, or other
entity, within 60 days of an election at which a candidate for elective office will appear on
the ballot, from distributing with actual malice materially deceptive audio or visual media
of the candidate with the intent to injure the candidate’s reputation or to deceive a voter into
voting for or against the candidate, unless the media includes a disclosure stating that the
media has been manipulated.”).
167 Cal. A.B. 730.
168 Christopher, supra note 10.
169 Cal. A.B. 730.
170 Christopher, supra note 10.
171 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 710 (2012) (plurality opinion).
172 See Christopher, supra note 10.
173 See Cal. A.B. 730.
174 See id.
175 See id. (prohibiting the distribution, instead of the creation).
176 See generally 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
518 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29:503
criticizing then-Senator Hillary Clinton when she was a Democratic presidential
nominee.177 Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)
specifically “prohibit[ed] corporations . . . from using their general treasury funds
to make independent expenditures for speech defined as an ‘electioneering communi-
cation’ or for speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.”178
An electioneering communication is “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communica-
tion” that depicts a candidate running for federal office made within thirty days of
a primary election or sixty days of a general election.179 Citizens United wanted to
release the documentary to the public within thirty days of the 2008 primary elec-
tion.180 The Court determined that there was “no reasonable interpretation of Hillary
other than as an appeal to vote against Senator Clinton,”181 but determined that
BCRA was unconstitutional in its application to Citizen United’s First Amendment
right to political speech.182
The California statute’s prohibition of the dissemination of deepfakes sixty days
before an election is quite similar to BCRA’s prohibition of electioneering commu-
nications thirty days before a primary election and sixty days before a general elec-
tion.183 In both instances, the laws attempt to protect the integrity of the election
process.184 However, BCRA was unconstitutional in its application because it restricted
political speech,185 whereas the California statute is seeking to restrict the spread of
false information.186 Deepfakes differ from simply advocating for or against a
political candidate; they seek to pass off false, and typically damaging, information
as truth.187 Deepfakes can be detrimental even beyond a thirty- or sixty-day prohibi-
tion because of the lasting negative effects of voter deception.188 Even though it has
met some backlash from a couple of groups,189 the California statute seems to pass
constitutional muster because it focuses on curbing the intentional dissemination of
false information that purposefully confuses voters and does not seek to infringe on
political speech.190
177 Id. at 319, 325.
178 Id. at 318–19 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)).
179 Id. at 321 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)).
180 Id.
181 Id. at 326.
182 Id. at 353.
183 Compare 52 U.S.C.A. §§ 30118, 30104(f)(3)(A) (West), with A.B. 730, 2019–2020 Reg.
Sess., ch. 493 (Cal. 2019). Both the federal and California laws seek to limit “targeted commu-
nications” that will reach a large number of people and thereby influence voter choice. Id.
184 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 321; Cal. A.B. 730.
185 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353.
186 Cal. A.B. 730; Christopher, supra note 10.
187 See Mihalcik, supra note 3.
188 See Green, supra note 61, at 1457–58.
189 See Haridy, supra note 165.
190 See Christopher, supra note 10.
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B. DEEPFAKES Accountability Act
The Defending Each and Every Person from False Appearances by Keeping
Exploitation Subject to Accountability Act (“DEEPFAKES Accountability Act”) was
introduced in Congress by Representative Yvette Clarke in June 2019.191 This bill
“requires mandatory labeling, watermarking, or audio disclosures for all ‘advanced
technological false personation records.’”192 Such records are defined in the bill as
“any media that falsely appears to depict speech or conduct of any person engaged
in ‘material activity,’ created via any technical means, that a reasonable person would
believe to be authentic, and that was created without the consent of the person de-
picted.”193 Additionally, violations of the proposed law may result in up to $150,000
in civil penalties and possible criminal penalties for “violations intended not only to
harass, incite violence, interfere in an election, or perpetuate fraud, but also to ‘humili-
ate’ the person depicted.”194 In essence, the media creator must have a malicious in-
tent.195 Furthermore, “[t]he act also establishes a right on the part of victims of synthetic
media to sue the creators and/or otherwise ‘vindicate their reputations’ in court.”196
One benefit to this proposed law, similar to that of the California statute, is that
it provides a legal remedy for those who are harmed by deepfakes.197 Another benefit
is that the law places “unauthorized digital recreations of people under the umbrella
of unlawful impersonation statutes.”198 Analogizing deepfakes to impersonation can
help guide courts as they navigate the issues surrounding deepfakes, because they are
a new problem.199 Although the proposed law has some flaws, it seems to be a step
in the right direction toward deepfake regulation.200
C. Considerations from Ferber
In New York v. Ferber, the New York statute in question “prohibit[ed] persons
from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of 16 by
191 H.R. 3230, 116th Cong. (2019).
192 Hayley Tsukayama, India McKinney & Jamie Williams, Congress Should Not Rush
to Regulate Deepfakes, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 24, 2019) (quoting H.R. 3230), https://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/06/congress-should-not-rush-regulate-deepfakes [https://perma
.cc/9YE4-UMM8].
193 Id. (quoting H.R. 3230).
194 Id. (quoting H.R. 3230).
195 See Devin Coldewey, DEEPFAKES Accountability Act Would Impose Unenforceable
Rules—But It’s a Start, TECHCRUNCH (June 13, 2019, 3:25 PM), https://techcrunch.com
/2019/06/13/deepfakes-accountability-act-would-impose-unenforceable-rules-but-its-a-start/
[https://perma.cc/5JRH-9ZNE].
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distributing material which depicts such performances.”201 Ferber was convicted
under this statute for selling films showing underage boys masturbating.202 The
Court determined that this statute did not violate the First Amendment, reasoning that
the “[s]tates are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depic-
tions of children” because of the harm to the “physiological, emotional, and mental
health of the child.”203 The Court even went so far as to say that the value of these
materials is “exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.”204 The reasoning behind prohibit-
ing deepfakes has some similarity to that of child pornography.205 Distributing false
information that appears to be true to damage the reputation of political officials or
influence voters is harmful to the democratic process and may change the outcome
of elections or people’s view of officials.206 Deepfakes are not just defamatory to the
person that they depict, they are also harmful to society as a whole.207 Similar to child
pornography in Ferber, the value of disseminating intentionally false information
as truth is also “exceedingly modest,” and likely “de minimis.”208 Deepfakes also differ
from buying a tabloid magazine or seeking out a fortune teller, where the person is
“looking to be lied to as entertainment.”209 In those instances, the consumers under-
stand that they are receiving false information, whereas deepfakes, in most instances,
provide information that people rely on as true.210 Thus, deepfakes present a danger
worthy of prohibition.
D. Breyer Concurrence in Alvarez
The Supreme Court determined that false statements were protected speech in
United States v. Alvarez.211 In that case, the Court examined the Stolen Valor Act,
which made it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals,
with an enhanced penalty for claims involving the Congressional Medal of Honor.212
Alvarez violated the Stolen Valor Act by falsely claiming that he won the Congres-
sional Medal of Honor, and he argued that the Act violated his free speech rights under
the First Amendment.213 The Court held that the Act violated the First Amendment,
201 458 U.S. 747, 749 (1982).
202 Id. at 751–52.
203 Id. at 756, 758.
204 Id. at 762.
205 See Green, supra note 61, at 1466–67 (drawing similarities between the “real harm”
to children resulting from child pornography and the “harm to living, identifiable humans—
to candidates” from counterfeit campaign speech).
206 See id. at 1457, 1463–64.
207 See id. at 1457.
208 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762.
209 Green, supra note 61, at 1468.
210 See id.
211 567 U.S. 709, 718, 730 (2012) (plurality opinion).
212 Id. at 715–16.
213 Id. at 715.
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reasoning that false statements were a protected form of speech and the Act was an
unconstitutional content-based speech restriction.214 The government failed to show
that false statements should comprise a new content category.215 Additionally, the
Act was not narrowly tailored enough, failing strict scrutiny, because it sought “to
control and suppress all false statements on this one subject in almost limitless times
and settings. . . . [W]ithout regard to whether the lie was made for the purpose of
material gain.”216 False statements on their own are not enough to make the speech
unprotected.217 Particularly, false statements about matters of public concern should
be protected to foster the marketplace of ideas.218
In his Alvarez concurrence, Justice Breyer agreed with the Court’s holding but
posited that intermediate scrutiny would be a more appropriate standard than strict
scrutiny in this case.219 Justice Breyer argued that the Act could be constitutional if it
were narrower in its scope.220 He recognized that false statements are deserving of some
protection, as they can “prevent embarrassment, protect privacy,” or even “promote a
form of thought that ultimately helps realize the truth.”221 However, the government
has an important objective in prohibiting false statements about military decorations
because of the confusion they create about who has earned the honor, which diminishes
the value of the award.222 The Stolen Valor Act may have been constitutional if it had
been narrowly tailored to “insist upon a showing that the false statement caused
specific harm or at least was material, or focus its coverage on lies most likely to be
harmful or on contexts where such lies are most likely to cause harm.”223
Similar to the interest of protecting the integrity of military decorations through
the Stolen Valor Act, the government would also have a legitimate interest in pro-
hibiting the distribution of deepfakes.224 A narrowly tailored law limiting the
distribution of deepfakes—specifically depicting political figures—would likely
pass constitutional muster under the First Amendment, particularly if it required a
showing of material harm.225 California has already achieved this with its new law
prohibiting the dissemination of deepfakes within sixty days of an election,226 but
214 Id. at 724, 729–30.
215 Id. at 718–22.
216 Id. at 722–23.
217 Id. at 721–22.
218 See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing, and (Deep) Fake News, 71 OKLA. L.
REV. 59, 66–67 (2018).
219 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 730 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Ultimately the Court has had to
determine whether the statute works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its
justifications.”).
220 Id. at 737.
221 Id. at 733.
222 Id. at 735.
223 Id. at 738.
224 See id.
225 See id.
226 See Christopher, supra note 10.
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if Congress implemented a federal law that prohibited deepfakes of this nature
entirely, it would likely be a more effective way to combat deepfakes.227
E. Special Virulence from R.A.V.
The Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul reiterated that speech restrictions
may only prohibit unprotected categories of speech and that content-based restrictions
cannot be substantially overbroad.228 In that case, petitioner R.A.V. burned a cross
on an African American family’s lawn and was charged under the Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance of St. Paul, which prohibited the display of a “symbol, . . . which
one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment
in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”229 The Court held that
the St. Paul ordinance violated the First Amendment because it was overbroad;
although it appeared to be aimed at fighting words, it prohibited “speech solely on the
basis of the subjects the speech addresses.”230 The Court reasoned that the government
may not regulate the use of fighting words “based on hostility—or favoritism—
towards the underlying message expressed.”231
The majority expressed that there is an exception to this rule when the proscribed
speech is especially harmful.232 Essentially, the exception applies when content-based
speech presents “special risks” that the government can suppress.233 Content-based
restrictions are typically prohibited to prevent the government from favoring one view-
point over another, but “content discrimination among various instances of a class of
proscribable speech often does not pose this threat.”234 Thus, “the particular virulence
exception . . . cover[s] prohibitions that are not clearly associated with a particular
viewpoint.”235 This principle is illustrated by the federal government’s ability to
criminalize threats that are specifically against the President of the United States.236
227 See id.
228 See generally 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
229 Id. at 379–80 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990), invalidated by
id. at 377).
230 Id. at 381.
231 Id. at 386.
232 See id. at 388 (“When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the
very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea
or viewpoint discrimination exists. Such a reason, having been adjudged neutral enough to
support exclusion of the entire class of speech from First Amendment protection, is also
neutral enough to form the basis of distinction within the class.”).
233 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 384 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
234 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
235 Black, 538 U.S. at 384.
236 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam).
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A statute prohibiting threats of violence against the president is a constitutional,
content-based restriction because of the special importance of protecting the presi-
dent.237 It does not favor one viewpoint over the other.238 Similarly, a statute specifically
banning deepfakes of political candidates and officials would have a special impor-
tance and be a valid content-based restriction.239 Protecting the president so that he
can effectively perform his duties and ensure smooth leadership of the country is an
important governmental interest that is furthered by a ban of threats of violence specifi-
cally against the president.240 Protecting the integrity of the political process in elec-
tions and reputation of government officials is also an important governmental interest
that would be furthered by a specific ban on deepfakes.241 Such a statute would not
be discriminating against a specific viewpoint and would be aimed at combatting the
dangers of deepfakes.242
F. False Campaign Speech
Regulating deepfakes has similar reasoning to that of regulating false campaign
speech generally.243 False campaign speech has the potential to “trick voters into
voting for the ‘wrong’ candidate or voting the ‘wrong’ way on a ballot measure.”244
“Wrong” in this case refers to an individual voting inconsistently with how he would
normally vote because of the false campaign speech.245 For example, a campaign lie
could be that a candidate was accepting bribes.246 This lie could lead voters who
supported that candidate to vote for someone else.247 Deepfakes certainly share this
ability to lead voters to make decisions contrary to their normal voting patterns.248
Justifications for regulating false campaign speech include the arguments that this
type of speech can manipulate the electoral process, “lower the quality of campaign
discourse and debate,” cause voters to become apathetic or distrustful of the voting
process, and “inflict reputational and emotional injury upon the attacked individual.”249
237 See id.
238 See id. at 708.
239 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388; Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
240 See Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
241 See Green, supra note 61, at 1460–61.
242 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
243 See Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 74
MONT. L. REV. 53, 55–56 (2013).
244 Id. at 55.
245 Id. at 55–56.
246 Id. at 55 (discussing McKimm v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 729 N.E. 2d 364 (Ohio
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1078 (2001)).
247 See id. at 55–56.
248 See id.
249 See id. at 63 (quoting William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First
Amendment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 294, 296 (2004)).
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These arguments have also been extended by lawmakers advocating for deepfake
regulations.250
Protecting voter integrity is surely a compelling interest, but there are concerns
surrounding the regulation of false election and campaign speech.251 One concern
rests on “the possibility that these laws will be the subject of manipulation by gov-
ernment authorities who want to favor one side or the other in an election.”252 Another
is that “we depend upon the campaigns themselves to allow voters to separate truth
from lies and decide how to vote in line with voters’ preferences.”253 With fact-
checking now a commonplace practice,254 the marketplace of ideas has a chance to
work as a check on false campaign speech.255 Diligent voters can do research, examine
all pertinent information, and decide for themselves what they believe to be the
truth.256 Lies are protected speech because they are still useful in the sense that they
add to the debate in the exchange of ideas and allow for true ideas to reveal them as
lies.257 Additionally, false campaign speech often consists of speech made directly
by candidates to voters.258 It is easier to expose this type of lie because a voter could
determine whether the statement was consistent with something the candidate said
before and it would be relatively easy for the truth to expose it.259 Deepfakes, on the
other hand, while a type of false campaign speech, are different because they convey
something that was never said at all.260 Other types of false campaign speech are still
true in the sense that a candidate or campaign actually made the statement.261 The
marketplace of ideas does not have the same opportunity to work because it is
incredibly hard to detect and fact-check deepfakes.262 Therefore, deepfakes require
regulation to protect voter integrity.263
G. Other Solutions Are Not Enough
Potential solutions outside of government regulation for addressing deepfakes
include, “(1) using existing laws, (2) urging additional action from social media
companies, (3) developing the technology to detect deepfakes, (4) fostering the use
250 See Christopher, supra note 10.
251 See Hasen, supra note 243, at 56.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 See id. at 53–54.
255 See id.
256 See Green, supra note 61, at 1458.
257 See Wellington, supra note 82, at 1130.
258 See Hasen, supra note 243, at 58.
259 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 726–27 (2012) (plurality opinion).
260 See Harwell, supra note 2.
261 See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 726–27.
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of private foundations and other organizations to respond to false information, and
(5) deploying digital literacy curriculum in schools.”264 These solutions are all prac-
tical approaches to deepfakes,265 but they fall short of adequately combatting the
problems that deepfakes present.
First, existing laws are not enough to stop deepfakes because they do not effec-
tively address the dangers that deepfakes pose.266 Deepfakes bear some similarity to
defamation and fraud, but laws concerning those unprotected categories of speech
are not strong enough because deepfakes present heightened dangers to elections,
the reputation of government officials, and national security.267 Existing elections
laws also fall short of tackling the problems of deepfakes.268 The Federal Election
Campaign Act, for example, prohibits a candidate from fraudulently misrepresenting
himself or “any committee or organization under his control.”269 While the Act pro-
hibits misrepresentations by the candidates themselves, it does not address deep-
fakes made by third parties portraying candidates.270 Deepfakes, then, cannot be
prohibited under this law. Other state election codes prohibit specific instances of
false political speech, which do not cover deepfakes unless they fall into one of those
specific categories.271
Second, urging social media companies to take action is not a reliable measure
against deepfakes because companies disagree on the best approach to combat deep-
fakes, where some will leave the videos on their websites and others will take them
down.272 Facebook, for example, has committed to the preservation of truth by flagging
false news, but the social media company has stated that it will not take misrep-
resentations down from its website.273 Facebook reasons that it can better preserve
freedom of expression by limiting sources spreading false information by decreasing
their ability to monetize and distribute content without actually removing the false
news.274 YouTube, on the other hand, quickly takes down deepfakes once they are
discovered because of the “deceptive practices” policies they implemented.275 As
previously stated, deception can have a lasting negative impact on the viewers of
264 Hall, supra note 33, at 71 (citations omitted).
265 See id.
266 See Harwell, supra note 2; Coldewey, supra note 195.
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deepfakes,276 and leaving deepfakes on social media websites where millions of
people can view them ultimately furthers the goal of deepfakes.277 Social media
companies are private entities that are not bound by the First Amendment,278 and
they have no affirmative duty to police deepfakes.279 Because of the ability of social
media companies to filter content as they see fit, they are an unreliable solution to
combat deepfakes.280 A new content category of unprotected speech for deepfakes
would be a better solution because it would prohibit the creation of the video itself,
making it less likely that deepfakes would be circulated across social media and
viewed by millions.281
Third, developing detection technologies to find deepfakes, while certainly a
necessary and crucial step toward combatting deepfakes, is not enough on its own
to counteract the dangers of deepfakes. Detection technology is advanced and can
pinpoint minute details that reveal the falsity of a video, but skilled video editors are
still able to make deepfakes seem real enough to the point where the technology
cannot detect subtle errors.282 Additionally, detection technology must be kept
relatively under wraps because “making the system more widely available carries
its own threat, by potentially allowing deepfake creators to examine the code and
find workarounds.”283
One recent effort to help researchers detect deepfakes was initiated by Google
when the company released 3,000 deepfakes that it created.284 Google “is hoping
their release will help academic researchers and other experts develop new ways to
uncover and combat the manipulated videos, potentially providing new tools for the
public and for publishers to pinpoint them.”285 Another similar effort was made by
Deep Video Portraits, “a company able to make and manipulate facial expressions
and head poses of figures,” which “released their technology as a means of informing
276 See, e.g., Green, supra note 61, at 1463 (discussing the potentially irreversible damage
of counterfeit campaign speech).
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the public of its capabilities and to hopefully deter those who might use it to trick
consumers.”286 Both of these efforts by Google and Deep Video Portraits seem bene-
ficial, but they have the potential to “backfire and create just the opposite result as
hackers use it to manipulate images and audio of politicians onto anything they
want.”287 For example, researchers at the State University of New York at Albany
discovered that a lack of blinking was an indicator that the video was a deepfake.288
Shortly after this discovery, one of the researchers “received an email from a
deepfake creator who said they had solved the problem in their latest fakes.”289
Developing tools to detect deepfakes is important, but the tools on their own are not
enough to combat deepfakes.290 If deepfakes are detected but not removed from the
internet or social media, then what benefit does detection bring? Even if deepfakes can
be detected and removed from the internet, it does not deter people from continuing
to create them because there are no laws regulating them.291 Making detection
technology available to the public also increases the risk of deepfake creators becom-
ing more skilled in their craft by learning what aspects the video detection technology
pinpoints.292 Regulation of deepfakes under a new category of unprotected speech
would bridge this gap and help avoid the further spread of deepfakes.
Fourth, encouraging private foundations and other organizations to address manip-
ulated media is also inadequate. This solution includes applying industry-developed
“private accreditation systems to establish industry standards, limit fraud, and ensure
the quality of services or products” to identify misinformation.293 While encouraging
foundations and other organizations to contribute to deepfake detection is beneficial,
they are similar to social media companies in that they are private entities with no
obligation to police deepfakes, and their reach would be on a much smaller scale
than government regulations.294
Fifth, implementing digital literacy curriculum in schools would “give children
the tools they need to make smart choices online.”295 This curriculum would help
students “distinguish between factual and fabricated content” and “critically evalu-
ate the content they are consuming.”296 Deepfakes are already difficult for artificial
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287 Id.
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intelligence and those savvy in technology and videography to identify.297 Teaching
children about deepfakes and giving guidance for navigating the digital world are
both important, but these solutions are still not enough to fix the problem or curb the
negative effects of deepfakes. Identifying deepfakes is far more challenging than
creating them.298
V. POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH REGULATION
Opponents of deepfake regulations argue that such regulations are at odds with
First Amendment protections of freedom of speech and cannot pass constitutional
muster.299 Critics of California’s new statute, for example, have stated that “[t]he law
is overbroad, vague, and subjective” and “hinges on whether the deepfake leads to
a fundamentally different impression of the candidate, which is not specific enough,
and could suppress speech.”300 Essentially, opponents fear that regulations of deep-
fakes would sweep in protected speech in violation of the First Amendment.301 The
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF) have also opposed California’s statute by writing to Governor Gavin Newsom,
expressing that the “political deepfake law would not solve the problem and may
only lead to more confusion.”302
The EFF also takes issue with the DEEPFAKES Accountability Act.303 The
organization argues that it is “unclear” how provisions of the proposed law, such as
mandatory labeling and watermarking, will actually address the problems of deepfakes
because those creating them for nefarious purposes are typically anonymous and un-
likely to adhere to the provisions of the statute.304 Additionally, the bill presents some
First Amendment concerns because criminal penalties can be imposed without a show-
ing of harm, and it fails to identify who has the burden of proof, which could have
a chilling effect on speech.305 Other critics of the DEEPFAKES Accountability Act
emphasize that the labeling and watermarks required by the Act are easy to remove.306
Offending the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech is always a concern
when creating a speech restriction.307 However, the Court has already found valid
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299 See Will Fischer, California’s Governor Signed New Deepfake Laws for Politics and






303 See generally Tsukayama et al., supra note 192.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 See Coldewey, supra note 195.
307 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003).
2020] DEEPFAKES: A NEW CONTENT CATEGORY FOR A DIGITAL AGE 529
ways to prohibit other categories of speech without violating the First Amendment,
and the same constitutional prohibition of speech is possible for deepfakes.308
In his article, Marc Blitz argued that “absent legally cognizable harm, fake news
and fake science fall squarely in the same category as protected speech,” and “[l]ike
religious ideas and political opinions, they are staunchly protected against govern-
ment censorship.”309 He went on to explain that the Justices in Alvarez “agreed that
where false statements arise in public debate and concern matters where disagree-
ment is an inevitable and desirable part of that debate . . . then the speaker of that
falsity should be just as protected as she is when she speaks a truth.”310 He also
warns of the danger presented by “letting government exercise coercive authority
over the exchange of ideas.”311 In essence, Blitz argues that the harm of regulation
outweighs any benefit that it may bring.312 The concern of government regulation
over false speech is certainly valid. The chilling of speech is always a concern when
evaluating the merits of speech restrictions. However, the narrow tailoring of any
ban of deepfakes would effectively limit the control that the government has over
false speech, and the ban would not be viewpoint-based.313 The problem with the
Stolen Valor Act in Alvarez was that it was overbroad because it essentially prohib-
ited false statements about receiving military decorations at all times, in any setting,
and for any purpose.314 Justice Breyer pointed out in his concurrence that there was
an important, if not compelling, government interest in limiting this kind of false
speech, and that purpose may have been achieved with a more narrowly tailored
law.315 The narrow tailoring of deepfake regulations would achieve the compelling
interest of protecting the integrity of elections, voter choice, and the reputation of
political figures by banning deepfakes.316
Other possible issues stem from existing case law.317 The Supreme Court has
determined that those who hold a public office or purposely put themselves in the
public eye open themselves up to criticism by the public.318 However, deepfakes
extend far beyond comment and criticism; they create an entirely false perception
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310 Id. at 71.
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of the public official or figure.319 Unlike parody320—where viewers understand state-
ments are made in jest—or valid discussions of matters of public concern,321 deepfakes
depict false realities that have the ability to thwart reputations and affect election
outcomes.322 Other arguments include the fact that the Supreme Court has been
extremely hesitant to recognize new categories of unprotected speech, particularly
absent persuasive evidence323 and a tradition of such a restriction.324 However, “mis-
information has a long history in our political processes,” just in a different form
than deepfakes today.325 During the presidential election of 1800, for example, Thomas
Jefferson “used a questionable journalist, James Callendar, to write defamatory
pieces about [John] Adams, including an inaccurate story that Adams wanted to start
a war with France.”326 The “deceptive propaganda tactic” is old, but the technology
is new and allows “ordinary citizens” to generate deceptively realistic information,
making deepfakes far more dangerous than stories in a newspaper.327 The harmful
dangers that deepfakes present and the history of deception in political processes
warrants consideration by the Supreme Court of restriction through a new content
category of unprotected speech.328
VI. PROPOSED DEEPFAKE REGULATION
After analyzing the current categories of unprotected speech under the First
Amendment and circumstances surrounding the establishment of those categories,
it seems fitting to create a new category of unprotected speech for deepfakes. The
prohibition should extend further than the new California statute by prohibiting
deepfakes generally, instead of just in the couple of months preceding an election,
and should apply to the United States as a whole.329 The category should be nar-
rowly tailored to deepfakes depicting political officials and candidates. Similar to
the California statute, the category should have exemptions for videos that are
parodies or satire or if the video includes a disclaimer stating that the video contains
false information.330 A law prohibiting deepfakes should also state that the creator
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of a deepfake video is the one to be held liable;331 people that share a deepfake on
social media, but who did not create the deepfake, should not be held liable for the
dissemination of the video. Otherwise there could be a chilling effect on speech if
people stop sharing videos of political figures on social media out of fear of un-
knowingly sharing a deepfake.332 The regulation should also specify who bears the
burden of proof and require a showing of harm for any criminal sanctions to solve
the issues presented with current proposed regulations.333
Deepfakes should constitute their own category of unprotected speech because
they present a unique and dangerous threat to our election system, the reputations
of political officials, and national security.334 Similar to the heightened importance
of protecting children with the prohibition of child pornography, the crucial interest
of protecting this country’s democratic processes merits the establishment of a new
category.335 False statements have traditionally fallen under protected speech, but
they may be prohibited in some instances with a narrowly tailored law when they are
particularly harmful.336 Similar to the interest in preserving the integrity of military
decorations by prohibiting false claims of their receipt, there is a compelling interest
in prohibiting purposefully deceptive false videos depicting political candidates and
officials.337 Additionally, this content-based regulation would pass constitutional muster
because deepfakes may be singled out based on the special importance of curbing
negative impacts on the political system.338 Just as threats against the President of
the United States may be specifically prohibited by the federal government, deepfakes
may also be specifically banned to further the interest of the smooth functioning of
our political system.339 Regulation may not eliminate deepfakes entirely, but it could
reduce the harms that they present and deter people from creating them.
CONCLUSION
In a polarized political environment, an examination of the dangers of deepfakes
and their threat to the election process is exceedingly vital.340 Deepfakes do not fall
within any of the justifications for freedom of speech protections under the First
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Amendment.341 The marketplace of ideas cannot function properly because citizens’
inability to discern if information is true or false stifles true counterspeech.342 Citizens
now have less incentive to be involved with the political process and the debate of new
ideas because there is no common starting point for truth.343 Furthermore, deepfakes
present unique issues that set them apart from current categories of unprotected speech.
The potential threats to the election process, national security, and the reputation of
government officials, coupled with the ability of deepfakes to rapidly spread, presents
a greater danger than defamation or fraud.344 Just as child pornography was given
its own content category separate from obscenity because of the unique harm to
children,345 deepfakes should constitute their own category of unprotected speech
because of the unique harm they pose to the political process. As technology con-
tinues to advance, deepfakes have the potential to become even more convincing
and harder to detect.346 A new content category of unprotected speech regulating
deepfakes seems to be the best option. Other proposed solutions fail because they
only address parts of the problem.347 If nothing greater is done to attempt to neutral-
ize their harmful effects, deepfakes will remain a threat to democracy.
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